Geopolitical Anatomy of the Decade and the West

 

Geopolitical Anatomy of the Decade and the West

It can be posited that following the conclusion of the Karabakh War, a new reality has been established in the Caucasus. This reality is novel in the sense that the influence of both Russia and Turkey has further intensified within the region—a consensus shared by the vast majority of international relations observers. I believe that much has already been written and articulated regarding the emergence of these circumstances—including our own analysis—and this specific matter does not require further detailed deliberation at this stage. However, we consider that it would be of interest to discuss the recent Karabakh War within the broader context of the geopolitical trends and landscape of the last decade, particularly if we observe the process of the ascension of this conflict’s main actors alongside the inertia of the West. This will allow us to view events through a certain historical prism and attempt to comprehend them, which we deem a necessary intellectual prerequisite for the formulation of the country's new security strategy in the future. The analysis of historical and geopolitical trends and factors is paramount in this regard.

Few would dispute the qualitatively new nature of the international relations system in the post-Cold War period. Aspects such as globalization and the emergence of qualitatively new conflicts have frequently become the subject of research by political scientists. However, this period and the ensuing new world order—in the political sphere, primarily—were expressed by the conclusion of the Cold War as a period of bipolar confrontation, followed by a dynamic of processes that effectively triggered a revision of the international relations system institutionalized by the outcome of the Second World War. The role of international organizations changed fundamentally. Gradually, NATO became the organization responsible for the world order.

Changes in the geopolitical sphere were also manifested by a fundamental shift in the balance of power on the Eurasian continent, the expansion of Western institutions, and the birth of an enlarging Europe. Added to this is the regulation of traditional conflicts and the emergence of new ones. Furthermore, it is becoming evident that Europe, without the US, lacks the resources to regulate these conflicts and ensure security in the western and south-western regions of Eurasia. Among geopolitical shifts, we must also highlight the creation of new global communication networks, which significantly alters the geopolitical configuration.

Simultaneously, international relations were conducted under the signature of US global dominant power, which allowed for the active implementation of a so-called "values-based" foreign policy and mass support for the democratization process worldwide. However, more effort was invested in this direction than realistic calculations for its implementation permitted. The major miscalculation and strategic error of US foreign policy of that period proved to be the second Iraq War and the attempts at the so-called democratization of Afghanistan and the region as a whole; it became apparent that the "new peace" which was supposed to follow the war—and which generally constitutes one of the main criteria for war and strategic planning—was not fully thought through. Despite active US efforts, it appeared that the existing societies of the region, notwithstanding the enormous resources invested in them, are not yet "naturally" ready to build democracy as it is understood in the West.

For foreign policy to be successful, it naturally requires the harmonious use of several instruments of power—including diplomacy, military force, and economic and social instruments—to achieve the desired goals. This process naturally approaches strategic planning, and its theoretical discussion is not the aim of this article; however, errors made in this calculation, and events developing in the Western world in general, made the maintenance of the existing reality impossible, and cracks began to appear in the context of US global foreign policy dominance. Russia’s revanchist policy, the rise of China, and the inability to reach a consensus on numerous important issues within the Western world significantly undermined the West's positions.

From 2011 onwards, the wave of the Arab Spring and the events that unfolded in Syria—the armed rebellion against Assad and bringing his regime to the brink of collapse—significantly disordered the situation in the Middle East region as well, the very locus of the confrontation between global powers. During the conflict, under conditions of the subsequent escalation of the Syrian war, and while numerous interested regional or sub-regional players became involved, passive responsive steps from the West created a situation that resulted in a power balance vacuum in the region.

Even a cursory glance at international relations or military history reveals that geostrategic realities cannot tolerate a power vacuum, and the vacated area is inevitably filled by new players. This is precisely what happened in the case of Syria and the region in general. The first such actor in the region became the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, known by the Arabic acronym Daesh/ISIS. It was the first to fill the power void created in the region. The liberation of territories occupied by Daesh in Northern Iraq and Syria, and the neutralization of this threat, ultimately required the combined efforts of the international community, the US, Russia, and local actors, along with several years of fighting.

It is noteworthy that this development of events was primarily caused by the ambivalent attitude of the US and its allies toward the Syrian conflict. There are several reasons for this, including the policy of former US President Barack Obama, which exercised maximum restraint regarding active intervention in the conflict, and, in general, the divergence of opinion that emerged between the US and its allies regarding the conflict. The reasons for this restraint should be sought in the experience of the protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where, in the final analysis, Washington was even forced to sit at the negotiating table with the Taliban, a terrorist organization. Furthermore, a factor influencing US policy regarding the Syrian crisis was the composition of the Syrian opposition. Washington, at the time, viewed the situation as a conflict between various extremist groups, such as Daesh and Al-Nusra on one hand, and the so-called "secular opposition" on the other. These groups were not supposed to be parties to negotiations, and the main emphasis was placed on regulating the situation through cooperation with Russia. Additionally, the US failed to ensure the establishment of a firm and long-term peace in Iraq and Afghanistan, causing various players in the region to begin seeking their own benefits...

Russia also capitalized on the resulting situation, using this crisis to present itself as a global player, to consolidate its international prestige, and to demonstrate its status as a full-fledged and equal player in the international relations arena. All prerequisites were created for Russia's return to the Middle East. As a result of these steps, virtually every Russian interest and goal outlined in its strategic documents was realized in the region. This was accompanied by China’s activation in all directions, especially through economic and financial projects. It became the main donor to Africa and Asia. Ultimately, we arrived at a given reality where, with the balance of power disrupted, Russia and China emerged as the primary victors. Today, the head of more than one important international organization is Chinese, including within the UN.

In addition, Iran has once again become active in the region—primarily in Iraq and Syria—directly aiding Shiite groups and organizations involved in the conflict and using them to implement its own interests.

Turkey was also afforded the opportunity for broad action, both in Syria and in the entire Mediterranean region, and its role was clearly visible in the recent Karabakh War. In sum, there has been a so-called "retreat" of the West, in the broad sense of the word, and this is clearly visible even with a cursory glance at the ruling regimes of the entire region. The power vacuum has been completely filled.

The reasons why the specificities characteristic of the region could not be fully taken into account at the time were, as we have already written, naturally errors in US strategic planning. Specifically, the cultural-civilizational reality, which is an integral part of local societies and the consequent influence on local political traditions, could not be fully analyzed. This can be characterized using the term of the famous geopolitician Carl Schmitt as a regional "Nomos." The German Carl Schmitt is known as a prominent jurist, political scientist, philosopher, and historian, who was also a supporter of fascist regimes. His ideas were formed under the influence of Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. Moreover, these ideas are directly linked to geopolitical concepts, and his main works, The Nomos of the Earth, Land and Sea, etc., relate precisely to comprehending the influence of geopolitical factors on civilization and political history. It is he who holds the concept of the so-called "Nomos."

Schmitt, like the traditions of the geopolitical approach, asserted the connection of political culture to space. For him, not only the state but the entire social reality—and especially rights—derives from the qualitative organization of space. Schmitt demonstrates that "Nomos" is a form of organization of being that establishes the most harmonious ratio both within a social ensemble and between these ensembles. "Nomos" is a special "synthetic" combination-manifestation of subjective and objective factors, which is organically revealed in the creation of legal and political systems. "Nomos" displays the cultural and natural peculiarities of a human collective in harmony with the environment.

Man is a being for whom, in terms of his mode of existence, the spatial context appears not as secondary, but as a fundamental context; historical space is characterized not only by geometric or natural-geographic properties and regularities but also by "human" or anthropological parameters, which are its historical-functional determinants. Consequently, the disruption of "traditional" ties through aggressive external interference in these systems fails to yield desired results, or does so with great difficulty. We witnessed precisely this in both countries mentioned above (Iraq, Afghanistan) and in the region generally; Western democracy could not enter the region as was expected in the US. The region remains an arena of civilizational clash.

As we can see, the "Clash of Civilizations" by another famous geopolitician, Samuel Huntington, and the civilizational distinctiveness he described, remains a significant factor, and talk of the "End of History" proved to be very premature.

Along with this, it is an axiom of political science that foreign policy represents a continuation of domestic policy and primarily serves it. However, the ratio between these two components has carried a different character in different epochs and was conditioned by various reasons. In relation to the international relations system, the nation-state appears as an element connected to other elements through various types of relationships. At the same time, the state, in the domestic-political sense, itself represents a system composed of various elements. In short, what appears as a system in one instance appears as an element in another. Thus, domestic and foreign policy flow into one another through various hierarchical levels and sublevels. For certain reasons, the result of these transitions is that the state's foreign policy becomes paralyzed. We witnessed precisely this in the case of both the US and the West in general, when it concerns the capabilities and demand for continuing foreign policy vectors following the end of the Cold War. Without a harmonious combination of the various components of this dichotomy, the process first stalled, then changed face, and was transformed in a new way.

In sum, we have arrived at a given reality where the local situation, in both the Middle East and the Caucasus region, has once again been mastered by large regional players who have long experienced serious problems in their relations with the West. We deliberately bypass the Far East and the rise of China in this instance, which is also a subject for separate discussion. The recent Karabakh conflict itself demonstrated the continuation of the geopolitical trend we discussed above; the "resolution" of the conflict occurred primarily through regional major actors—Turkey and Russia—in such a way that the role of the West, its institutions, and formats was absolutely nullified.

Furthermore, in the case of the US, significant processes developed inside the country—which are still ongoing—and consequently influence its foreign policy efforts as well. Today, matters have effectively reached the point of civil escalation, which has also turned into two opposing electoral camps within the country. If we observe, regarding supporters, as in 2016 so too now, the US center—its non-urban part—opposed the voters of large and developed cities. A struggle began against certain signs of the past and a clash of values within the country. It is as if the digital, informational, modern society clashed with relatively old, industrial, and post-industrial sentiments and values.

These events involuntarily remind us of an interesting theory authored by the famous American futurist Alvin Toffler. A discussion of his theory again leads us to the readiness of societies and civilizations to accept systems new to them, or to integrate into them, such as, for example, Western-type democracy for the Middle East and its neighboring regions broadly.

In Toffler's view, any major change in the way of life of people and society in general causes a conflict between the new and the old. The conflict, by its nature, can be different: social, religious, cultural, etc. Whatever it may be, any major change or transformation in the life of a society or country proceeds against the backdrop of conflict.

According to Toffler, societies have passed through two main stages of development: agrarian and industrial. Today, it faces new changes. Technological, economic, ecological, and demographic shifts are evident. In Toffler's opinion, if we take everything together, we get excellent soil for a new conflict.

In the author's view, history knows many examples of such conflicts. He cites the American Civil War as an example, the bloodiest confrontation in history up to that time. It was not merely a confrontation against the slave-owning South, but a confrontation of the industrial North against the agrarian South. It was a confrontation of one form of life against another, older one. The US could not achieve broad industrial development on a continental scale until the North won over the South, until American society transitioned from an agrarian way of life to an industrial one. We are dealing with a clash of the past and the present, where, in Toffler’s view, the past always loses.

Today, in Toffler's opinion, the digital revolution, the rise of biotechnologies, and a new accelerated and globalized way of life are evident. Viewed differently, according to Toffler, there are defenders of the old industrial way of life who oppose the arrival of a knowledge-based economy and society—that is, the new, post-agrarian and post-industrial, Third Wave society. In such a situation, according to Toffler, political or other affiliations are only conditional; the most important thing is the attitude toward change (attitude toward new values - G.A.). This is a confrontation between two ways of life, or two civilizations. One of them yields positions, while the other experiences an ascent.

Also, according to Toffler, societies make war the same way they create wealth. When countries industrialized their economies, they also industrialized their armies. The machine age gave us military machines; mass production means gave us means of mass destruction. (And the digital era shifted the battlefield to information and digital technologies - G.A.).

In Toffler's view, Third Wave warfare today implies rapid maneuver, small mobile units, the massive use of digital and information technologies, high-precision strikes, and coordinated action of branches from land, air, space, and sea. Toffler effectively describes everything characteristic of modern theaters of war. Ultimately, it can be said that confrontation appears in Toffler as a means of social development.

This theory is interesting insofar as its components can indeed be applied to different societies or civilizations. I believe parallels with contemporary US public and social life are striking. The very clash of old and new within US society reflects, to a certain extent, precisely similar historical processes. On one hand, a modern, supra-identity society opposes the old, value systems based on the old order; a developed urban society opposes the province.

It is noteworthy that internal political and social issues have become a significant problem for Europe as well. Including from a cultural perspective, as problems surrounding immigrants have clearly shown us. Let us recall statements on the failure of European multiculturalism. The influence of these processes on the domestic and foreign policy of the EU and Britain, with all the consequent results, no longer provokes any dispute.

In the case of China too, when discussing threats to the ruling regime stemming from the growth of its middle class, the conversation touches precisely upon the demands emerging in this class for greater personal freedoms, directed toward new broad identities, demands, and social processes, which oppose the old. The ruling elite there today is trying to direct precisely this energy toward the interests of the Chinese Communist Party.

Approximately the same trend exists in Russia, though only time will tell to what extent these processes will bring about breakthrough changes in both places, even through conflicts that Toffler deems inevitable. Today, the political elites in these countries will inevitably have to control these processes, because if, according to Toffler, the new defeats the old in society, this will necessarily trigger a demand for the formation of political and social structures corresponding to the new reality.

In today's reality, when everyone awaits the formulation and realization of the foreign policy vision of the new US administration, it is very important to analyze the possible influence of precisely such local and global events on the formation of the content of this policy.

However, in the case of the US, it will be very difficult to regain lost positions in the global arena and to achieve the reconsolidation of the Western world. Especially when, in many places, it will already have to overcome quite strong hard power.

Thus, events currently unfolding in the world generally are characterized by considerable complexity according to geopolitical and other types of theories, where ensuring national security and pursuing state interests in the foreign policy arena requires significant comprehension and observation of global processes. At the same time, traditional elements of power do not disappear anywhere; on the contrary, in this situation, they are the primary instruments for protecting and pursuing one's own interests. The factor of force remains the main ally in modern times as well, and one would be hard-pressed to find a situation where the justice of the weak is accorded appropriate respect. This is precisely the purpose, in relation to Georgia, of the call by various foreign political and military figures to the West, that the military presence in the region—that is, the quality of hard power—must necessarily be increased so that there is a realistic possibility of exerting appropriate influence on processes.

In conclusion, it can be boldly stated that the results of the recent Karabakh War, by its course and the nature of the involvement of regional powers, is a logical result of global historical and geopolitical trends. But here arises another important question: what is the fate of small states in such a world, whose security environment is characterized by exceptional complexity and difficulties? I think this question is already a subject for separate future analysis, although it can be said right now that it cannot in any way be discussed in isolation from the modern development trends of the world and geopolitical realities.

Giorgi Antadze

Tbilisi, 2020