Trump, Greenland and America's Waters - What Geopolitics Tells Us

 

Trump, Greenland and America's Waters - What Geopolitics Tells Us

This article represents an updated version of the Georgian-language variant.

Trump's discourse regarding Panama, Greenland, and Canada just before his inauguration, may have appeared unexpected, yet from a purely geopolitical perspective, it can be argued that these statements represent the manifestation of traditional American strategic thinking. Let us examine this development more thoroughly through the lens of geopolitical theory.

As you may recall, etymologically, the term "geopolitics" is composed of two Greek words: Geo (earth) and Politikos (everything related to the city-state: the state, the citizen, etc.). Accordingly, geographical determinism and its associated doctrines have played a paramount role in the development of this discipline.

Trump's articulated positions are precisely imbued with classical geopolitical thinking. Why is this the case? What constitutes a geopolitical approach? What does it entail?

The most general answer to these questions is that the geopolitical approach encompasses those aspects of global political reality analysis that are oriented toward spatial indicators. Geopolitics does not examine the state in stasis, as an unchanging entity, but rather in dynamics—as a living organism. Geopolitics studies the state in its relationship with the environment, primarily with space, and aims to resolve problems arising from the state's spatial relationships.

The broadest and most prevalent geopolitical methodological formula is represented by historical dualism—the confrontation between, on one side, the land-based power of tellurocracy, the terrestrial nomos, Eurasia, the Heartland, the "Middle Earth," the "ideocratic civilization," the "geographical axis of history," Eurasianism, and on the other side, the sea-based power of thalassocracy, Sea Power, the maritime nomos, the Atlantic (Anglo-Saxon world), commercial civilization, and the insular "outer crescent." This can be considered the fundamental law of classical geopolitics.

The American perspective on the space surrounding it was shaped by its geography in terms of sea power—thalassocracy. This approach had its own theorists and apologists.

Within the framework of military-strategic theories, American geopolitical approaches were particularly influenced by the development and deepening work of American naval theorist and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914). He was not merely a theorist but actively participated in politics. He exerted significant influence on such politicians as Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt. Moreover, if we examine U.S. military strategy throughout the twentieth century, Mahan's ideological influence is clearly discernible.

Mahan identified a special sphere within global territorial space between the 30th and 40th parallels—the so-called "zone of conflict," where, in his view, regardless of the will of specific politicians, the clash of interests between "maritime empires" (which control oceanic spaces) and "land empires," which rely on the Eurasian continental core, is inevitable. For a maritime empire to survive, it must push the "land empire" as deeply as possible into Eurasia and succeed in conquering significant coastal territories. It must bring "coastal nations" under its control, which requires "encircling the opponent within its own military-naval bases." Military-strategic theories introduced into geopolitical methodology the concept of key points and zones that enable the control of large portions of a potential geopolitical opponent's territories.

For Mahan, the understanding of "sea power" is entirely based on "maritime commerce," while the military-naval fleet serves merely as a guarantor for ensuring this commerce. Mahan goes further, considering "sea power" as a special civilizational type that is good and effective and consequently destined for world dominance.

Mahan's ideas gained widespread acceptance throughout the world and influenced many European strategists. Continental Germany itself, through Admiral Tirpitz, adopted these theses and actively began developing its naval fleet.

Mahan was an active supporter of President Monroe's (1758-1831) doctrine—the same Monroe whose advocacy can be seen in recent statements by Trump and his security team. Mahan believed that the United States had a "maritime destiny" and that the "Manifest Destiny" consisted of achieving strategic integration of the American continent in the first stage, followed by the establishment of global dominance. (As we can see, this prophetic thesis of Mahan's was almost fully realized in recent history, including discussions about Canada's annexation, etc.)

In his book "The Interest of America in Sea Power," Mahan argued that for the United States to become a global superpower, it must fulfill the following points:

1. Actively cooperate with British sea power;
2. Oppose Germany's naval pretensions;
3. Monitor Japan's expansion in the Pacific Ocean and oppose it;
4. Coordinate with European states in joint action against Asian peoples.

Independently of Mackinder, Mahan reached analogous conclusions when examining the most important threats to "sea power." In his view, these threats are primarily the continental states of Russia and China, and secondarily, Germany. It is noteworthy in this context that the Germany-Russia (USSR) alliance in 1939 indeed became the greatest threat to the peripheral states of the "outer crescent"—that is, pressure from tellurocracy, or land-based states.

What we have been observing for a long time, including against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Ukraine, is China's rise and Russia's alignment with China as a result of this war. At this stage, this process is only strengthening. Given everything we discussed above, this should be perceived as an existential threat to America. Trump's team does not hide this threat either, as you may recall. The complete consolidation of this direction would be the development of disintegrative, or even destructive, internal political situations within the European Union—that is, in continental Europe. We occasionally observe attempts at this from the "land bloc."

Simultaneously, today's global world is also characterized by pressure from the so-called autocratic axis, and we actively see the processes of this axis's formation, including through formalized agreements (China-Russia, Iran-Russia, BRICS, etc.). Naturally, in this confrontation, geopolitical theories tell us that the main driving force of the "land" today is China, which, if you observe, is precisely attempting to break through the maritime "blockade" around the South China Sea and penetrate deep into the continent through trade and commerce—which, according to Mahan, is the main interest of thalassocracy and has been so in recent decades. The greatest market for today's trade and sales is the Southern Hemisphere—the so-called Global South.

Regarding Greenland, the situation had reached the point where the construction of large airports necessary for Greenland's economic development was to be financed and executed by China, which was recently thwarted through American efforts. Additionally, today's ongoing war between China and America in terms of trade, semiconductors, electronic devices, and artificial intelligence development is becoming increasingly active. In this regard, China has serious advantages in terms of access to raw material resources necessary for these sectors. It should be noted that Greenland is rich in a significant portion of these resources. All of this is compounded by the possibilities of increased navigation and trade in the Northern Hemisphere as a result of global warming.

If we examine the current global situation through the lens of the geopolitical theory presented above and considering the United States' historical strategic culture, Trump's or Washington's "nervousness" regarding the waters around Panama, Canada, and Greenland becomes absolutely logical and understandable. It will also be understandable if, in the future, the "maritime bloc" (the collective West under American leadership) again attempts to draw Russia into its camp under certain circumstances, in order to prevent the formation of those historical blocs that Alfred Mahan spoke about approximately 200 years ago and which once nearly defeated the entire world. And if our reasoning is correct, the maximum isolation of China from Russia and primarily from Russian resources should be a significant American interest.

We have grown accustomed to employing the popular vernacular of geopolitics, which frequently pertains to interstate relations and international affairs. However, geopolitics in its classical conception examines phenomena through its own distinct theoretical frameworks. We are presently situated in an era that necessitates a renewed examination of the relevance of geopolitical theories to empirical reality. The developments surrounding the Ukrainian conflict, Trump’s administration’s foreign policy presents us with optimal analytical opportunities in this regard.

Could Trump's somewhat lenient attitude toward Moscow and Vladimir Putin, evident from the very first day of his presidency, be an indicator of this? As if he is deliberately trying to protect Russia from collapse? Time will tell. As often happened in the past, Russia's greatest enemy was Russia itself. Does America have levers of influence over Moscow, including in the form of financial assets? what will happen when the 50 days given to Russia by Trump expire? Will he become sharp toward Putin again, or will he continue the existing attitude?!

Let us see.